Sunday 1 September 2013

The Guns of August



President Kennedy seeks counsel from General Douglas A. MacArthur
First hand witness to the folly of the Guns of August, 1914
August, 1962

"MacArthur believes it would be a mistake to fight in Laos. It would suit the Chinese Communists whom he feels we should have destroyed at the time of the Korean War. He thinks we should fight a rear-guard action in the southeast of Asia. He does not feel we should interviene at this time in Cuba because it does not represent a military danger to us although the time may come when we may have to do so. He thinks our line should be Japan, Formosa, and the Phillipines. He feels it important that we take the initiative with regard to peace with the Russians as they always make us appear to be the aggressor. He said that the "chickens are coming home to roost" from Eisenhower's years and I live in the chicken coup....that Eisenhower should have done something about Cuba sooner."

President Kennedy Seeks Advice from Gen. MacArthur on China & The Guns of August 1914 from Spike1138 on Vimeo.
Recorded August 16, 1962, White House Oval Office.

Harry S. Truman and Dean Acheson, the Secretary of State, told MacArthur to limit the war to Korea. MacArthur disagreed, favoring an attack on Chinese forces. Unwilling to accept the views of Truman and Acheson, MacArthur began to make inflammatory statements indicating his disagreements with the United States government.

MacArthur gained support from right-wing members of the Senate such as Joe McCarthy who led the attack on Truman's administration: "With half a million Communists in Korea killing American men, Acheson says, 'Now let's be calm, let's do nothing'. It is like advising a man whose family is being killed not to take hasty action for fear he might alienate the affection of the murders."

In April 1951, Harry S. Truman removed MacArthur from his command of the United Nations forces in Korea. McCarthy now called for Truman to be impeached and suggested that the president was drunk when he made the decision to fire MacArthur: "Truman is surrounded by the Jessups, the Achesons, the old Hiss crowd. Most of the tragic things are done at 1.30 and 2 o'clock in the morning when they've had time to get the President cheerful."

On his arrival back in the United States MacArthur led a campaign against Harry S. Truman and his Democratic Party administration. Soon after Dwight Eisenhower was elected president in 1952 he consulted with MacArthur about the Korean War. MacArthur's advice was the "atomic bombing of enemy military concentrations and installations in North Korea" and an attack on China. He rejected the advice and MacArthur played no role in Eisenhower's new Republican administration.

After leaving the United States Army, MacArthur accepted a job as chairman of the board of the Remington Rand Corporation. Douglas MacArthur died in the Water Reed Hospital, Washington, on 5th April, 1964.

Edward Murrow, CBS radio broadcast from London (11th April 1951)

"No words of any broadcaster will add to, or detract from, General MacArthur's military stature. When the President relieved him of his commands at one o'clock this morning, a sort of emotional chain reaction began. It might be useful to examine some of the issues raised by this decision, for they are rather more important than the fate of a general, or a president, or a group of politicians.

Did the President have the constitutional power to fire General MacArthur? He did, without question; even the severest critics of his action admit this. One of the basic principles of our society is that the military shall be subject to civilian control. At the present time when, as a result of our rearmament programme, the military is exercising increasing influence and power in both domestic and international affairs, it is of some importance that that principle be maintained. It is a principle to which the over-whelming majority of professional soldiers subscribe.

There developed, over a period of months, a basic disagreement between General MacArthur on the one hand and the President, the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the State Department and our European allies on the other as to how the war in Korea should be conducted; and, more importantly, a disagreement as to how, and where, the forces of the free world should be deployed to meet the threat of world Communism. General MacArthur was sent certain instructions, and he ignored or failed to obey them. Those orders, wise or foolish, came from his superiors. We as private citizens are entitled to agree or disagree with the policy and the orders, but so far as military men are concerned, the Constitution is quite specific. It doesn't say that a President must be a Republican or a Democrat, or even that he must be wise. It says that he is the commander-in-chief. There occurred an open and public clash between civilian and military authority. It was dramatic, and it was prolonged over a period of almost four months. What hung in the balance was not MacArthur's reputation as a soldier, or Truman's as a statesman, but rather the principle of civilian control of the military men and forces of this country. The issue has now been resolved. It is, as many have remarked, a personal tragedy for General MacArthur at the climax of a brilliant military career. But these matters must be viewed in perspective. Tragedy has also overtaken about fifty-eight thousand young Americans in Korea, and for about ten thousand of them it was permanent - before their careers began.

That war is still going on. Is there any reason to believe that General MacArthur's removal will increase the prospects of ending it? Some diplomats are inclined to hope it will. They point to the fact that the Communists have labelled MacArthur the number one aggressor and warmonger. But there is nothing in Communist doctrine to indicate that their policies are determined by the personalities of opposing generals, nothing to hint their objectives do not remain what they were."



According to the cover notes of an audio version of The Guns of August, "[President John F. Kennedy] was so impressed by the book, he gave copies to his cabinet and principal military advisers, and commanded them to read it."
In One Minute to Midnight on the Cuban Missile Crisis, Michael Dobbs notes the deep impression Guns had on Kennedy. He often quoted from it and wanted "every officer in the Army" to read it as well. Subsequently, "[t]he secretary of the Army sent copies to every U.S. military base in the world."


Kennedy drew from The Guns of August to help in dealing with the Cuban Missile Crisis, including the profound and unpredictable implications a rapid escalation of the situation could have.

The British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan, who had served on the Western Front during the First World War, was also profoundly affected by the book.  In his diary for Monday, 22 October 1962, he wrote:
Washington, in a rather panicky way, have been urging a NATO 'alert' with all that this implies (in our case, a Royal Proclamation and the call up of Reservists). I told him that we do not repeat not agree at this stage. N. General Norstad agreed with this and said he thought NATO powers would take the same view. I said that 'mobilization' had sometimes caused war. Here it was absurd since the additional forces made available by 'Alert' had no military significance.
Graham Allison, a political scientist who covered the Cuban Missile Crisis in Essence of Decision, noted the effect of the Tuchman's book on Kennedy, but also its implications for the proper study of decision-making and warfare. Allison created an entire model of decision-making, which he called the "Organizational Process Model," based on such issues as those covered by Tuchman, a model which directly countered game theory and other rationalistic means of explaining events.



Throughout the aforementioned narrative, Tuchman constantly brings up the numerous misconceptions, miscalculations, and mistakes that she believed resulted in the tragedy of trench warfare. Among these were:
  • Economic miscalculation. In Tuchman's view, both European intellectuals and leaders overestimated the power of free trade. These individuals believed that the interconnection of European nations due to this trade would stop a continent-wide war from breaking out, as the economic consequences would be too great. However, this assumption was incorrect. For example, Tuchman noted that Moltke, when warned of such consequences, refused to even consider them in his plans, arguing he was a "soldier," not an "economist."

  • Unfounded belief in quick warfare. Except for a very few politicians (who were at the time ridiculed and excluded because of their views with only Lord Kitchener having the authority to act on his anticipation of a long war), all the leaders of the major combatants believed the war would be concluded in a matter of weeks, by the end of 1914 at the absolute latest. Tuchman recounted the story of a British statesman who, after he warned others that the war might last two or three years, was branded a "pessimist." This false assumption had disastrous effects, especially on logistics (see below).

  • Over-reliance on morale and the offensive. Tuchman details, in depth, how the leaders of the major powers, before the war, developed a philosophy of warfare based almost entirely on morale, a constant offensive, and retaining the initiative. Joffre, in particular, refused to consider going on the defensive — or even to slow the offensive — even when the realities of the battlefield demonstrated that this approach was not working.

  • Failure to consider political backlash. Many war planners did not take into consideration the political and treaty-based consequences of their offensive actions. As Tuchman argues, the German leaders in particular refused to consider the consequences of moving their armies into Belgium, despite that country's neutrality. Despite Moltke's concerns, German generals insisted on moving through Belgium because they needed to maneuver. They failed (or refused) to realize that by invading Belgium they effectively forced Britain to declare war because of existing treaties and national honor.

  • Outdated forms of wartime etiquette. Although the technology, aims, methods, and plans of World War I were drastically different from earlier wars, military leaders continued to insist upon a form of martial etiquette from civilians which increased resentment between the countries. To illustrate, Tuchman regularly quotes from the diaries of German generals who commandeered the homes and supplies of civilians. One recurrent theme within their diary entries was that they simply couldn't understand why the property owners refused to fully cooperate, in line with past wartime courtesy. In a somewhat comical passage, Tuchman even quotes from a general who criticized the master of a Belgian house for failing to sit with him at dinner and observe proper mealtime etiquette, despite the fact that the Germans had violated his country's neutrality, taken over his house, and stolen or destroyed much of his property.

Overall, Tuchman argued that none of the war's major combatants wanted a prolonged war, but the above factors caused it nonetheless. Likewise, she argued that even successes, such as the First Battle of the Marne (a French victory), were to some extent accidental victories that were won despite, not because of, military leadership or strategy.

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